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INTRODUCTION 
On 2 September 2011, Professor Dubner received an e-mail from a 
gentleman by the name of Andrew Mwangura which was sent from 
Mombasa, Kenya. This same gentleman, and between 20 and 25 people, 
including Professor Dubner, were invited to the Harvard’s Kennedy School 
of Government under the auspices of the World Peace Foundation and the 
Cambridge Coalition to Combat Piracy (December 2009) in order to express 
views on how to resolve piracy off the coast of Somalia. Included in this 
group were scholars, diplomats, senior ranking military officers, intelligence 
representatives, shipping industry officials, and other experts on maritime 
piracy. They came from all over the world to attend this important meeting 
They met in a conference room in the Harvard Kennedy Center and 
discussed the situation for two and a half days. The results of these sessions 
became embodied in an article called “Combating Maritime Piracy: A 
Policy Brief with Recommendations for Actions.”1 Since that meeting and 
resulting policy brief, there have been numerous articles and studies by the 
United Nations’ maritime-economists. Most recently, the United Nations 
(U.N.) issued a Report of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the 
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 1. ROBERT I. ROTBERG, COMBATING MARITIME PIRACY: A POLICY BRIEF 
WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTIONS, WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION, POLICY 
BRIEF #11 (World Peace Found. 2010), available at http://www.somalilandtimes.net/sl/ 
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Establishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts (hereinafter, 
Modalities Report).2 
Perhaps the most interesting statement on the current state of piracy does 
not come from U.N. documents and other articles, but from the 
aforementioned email that was received from Mr. Mwangura.3 He posed a 
series of questions and requested assistance in obtaining certain data on 
Somali sea piracy occurrences from September 2010 to August 2011. The 
request he posed is quite telling (see Appendix A). The questions 
demonstrate how the crime of piracy has expanded from the simple stealing 
of petty fund boxes and safes on board ships to the kidnapping of human 
beings and the hijacking of ships. The questions show that, even without the 
answers, exactly how bad the situation has become with regard to sea piracy 
committed in both near and far from the 1800 mile coast off of Somalia. 
The answers to these questions can be found in many sources, including 
the United States Government Counter-Piracy Steering Group, the Contact 
Group on Piracy, and their five working groups and the International 
Maritime Bureau.4 The reason for asking these questions was never given 
but it is obvious that the simple crime of piracy has now become rather a 
  
 2. U.N. Secretary-General, The Modalities for the Establishment of Specialized 
Somali Anti-Piracy Courts: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 (June 15, 
2011), available at http://unpos.unmissions.org/Portals/UNPOS/Repository%20UNPOS/S-
2011-360%20%2815Jun2011%29%20Piracy.pdf [hereinafter The Modalities]. 
 3. See infra App. A. 
 4. See Counter Piracy and Maritime Security (PM/CPMS), U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm (“The U.S. Government Counter-Piracy 
Steering Group is an “executive-level body created to implement the National Action and 
Partnership Plan to Combat Piracy off the Horn of Africa, this group is co-chaired by the 
Departments of State and Defense and reports to the National Security Staff. Also 
represented on this group are the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, 
Transportation, and the U.S. Agency for International Development.”); see Background, 
CONTACT GROUP ON PIRACY OFF THE COAST OF SOMALIA, 
http://www.thecgpcs.org/about.do?action=background (last visited Feb. 12, 2012) (“Pursuant 
to UN Security Council Resolution 1851, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia (CGPCS) was established on January 14, 2009 to facilitate the discussion and 
coordination of actions among states and organizations to suppress piracy off the coast of 
Somalia. This international forum has brought together more than 60 countries and 
international organizations all working towards the prevention of piracy off the Somali 
coast.”); see International Maritime Bureau, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://icc-
ccs.org/home/imb (last visited Feb. 14, 2012) (“The International Maritime Bureau [(IMB)] 
is a specialized division of the International Chamber [o]f Commerce [(ICC)]” that was 
“established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight against all types of maritime crime and 
malpractice.”). Since 1992, the IMB has operated its Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC), the 
main objective of which ”is to be the first point of contact for the shipmaster to report” an 
actual or attempted attack or even suspicious movements, “thus initiating the process of 
response.” IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre (last visited Feb. 14, 2012). The PRC’s “main aim” is to 
“raise awareness within the shipping industry, which includes the shipmaster, ship-owner, 
insurance companies, traders, etc[.], of the areas of high risk associated with piratical attacks 
or specific ports and anchorages associated with armed robberies on board ships.” Id. 
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strain economically on maritime shipping companies and countries, such as 
the United States and European Union. The purpose of this article is to 
show how and why there is a “cottage” industry developing to both prevent 
and fight piracy. Mr. Mwangura ends his e-mail as follows: “Everyone is 
crying out for peace, none of them is crying for justice. We want equal 
rights and justice.” (See Appendix A).  The assumption is that this refers to 
the seamen and other civilian hostages that are being held over long periods 
of time. The waste of human life is appalling. The economics of the 
situation is one of the main causes of sea piracy. 
I. THE EXTENT OF THE SEA PIRACY PROBLEM 
One of the key questions asked in Mr. Mwangura’s email was whether or 
not the prosecution of pirates had any effect. The answer lies partly with the 
economics involved. When reading the statistics, sea piracy seems to be 
getting worse, not better. For example, as of March 2011, Contact Group on 
Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) Plenary Session reported that 
pirates were holding 26 ships and 573 hostages; in July 2011, CGPCS 
Plenary Session reported 17 ships and 393 hostages; and in November 2011, 
CGPCS Plenary Session reported 10 ships and 243 hostages.5 These reports 
show that there is a continuing trend of pirates capturing fewer ships (“IMB 
credits the reduction in hijackings to the intervention by international naval 
forces.”).6 However, in contrast to the trend of fewer hijackings is the fact 
that piracy is a growing threat because the number of pirate attacks 
continues to be on the rise, “albeit with a decreasing rate of success.”7 In 
July 2011, the IMB released a report stating that pirates are now targeting 
areas frequented by crude oil tankers.8 Furthermore, “Ships, including oil 
and chemical tankers, are increasingly being attacked with automatic 
weapons and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Whereas five years ago 
  
 5. See also Contact Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Communiqué: Ninth 
Plenary Session of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, N.Y., July 14, 
2011, available at http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=18 (follow 
“Communique from 9th Session” hyperlink) [hereinafter ninth Plenary Session]; Contact 
Group of Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, Communiqué: Tenth Plenary Session of the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, N.Y., Nov. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.thecgpcs.org/plenary.do?action=plenarySub&seq=19 (follow “Communique 
from 10th Session” hyperlink) [hereinafter Tenth Plenary Session]. 
 6. See Ninth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 1. See also As World Piracy Hits a 
New High, More Ships are Escaping Somali Pirates, Says IMB Report, INT’L MAR. BUREAU 
(Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/969-as-world-piracy-hits-a-new-high-more-
ships-are-escaping-somali-pirates-says-imb-r. 
 7. Tenth Plenary Session, supra note 5, at 1. 
 8. Pirate Attacks at Sea Getting Bigger and Bolder, Says IMB Report, INT’L 
MAR. BUREAU (July 14, 2011), http://www.icc-ccs.org/news/450-pirate-attacks-at-sea-
getting-bigger-and-bolder-says-imb-report.International Maritime Bureau (IMB) 2011 
figures show that Somali pirates this year have initiated more attacks, 231 this year, up from 
126 for the first nine months of 2010. Id. 
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pirates were just as likely to brandish a knife as a gun, this year guns were 
used in 160 attacks and knives in 35.”9 Owners of oil and energy tankers are 
also claiming that insider information is allowing pirates to target their 
ships.10  
“The geographical area of the attacks now stretches to 2.8 million square 
miles, an area that is increasingly difficult for naval forces to patrol.”11 In 
addition, according to the Modalities Report, the expanding range of attacks 
has been achieved through the use of mother ships.12 The Modalities Report 
stated that Pirates are now 
[u]sing large vessels with supplies for smaller pirate vessels used in 
attacks, and with as  many as a hundred pirates on board to guard 
hostages and to deter rescue attempts. Pirate  attacks now often involve 
the use of overwhelming force to overcome security personnel  on board 
merchant ships. Hijacked crews have been used as “human shields” 
against  military intervention, and have been threatened as a means to 
deter military attack.13 
It is estimated that there are about “50 main pirate leaders, around 300 
leaders of pirate attack groups, and aground 2,500 ‘foot soldiers.’ It is 
believed that financing is provided by [approximately] 10 to 20 individuals. 
In addition, there is a large number of armed individuals guarding captured 
ships, and numerous ransom negotiators” working for the pirates.14 
Against this background, this essay will explore the “classical” period of 
piracy to see how much difference there is between the operations of pirates 
centuries ago, in the Caribbean, for example, and operations that are being 
used today off of Somalia. It will be observed that everything has changed 
and nothing has changed meaning that though there are numerous new 
tactics used by pirates and their backers, the laws regarding piracy are 
essentially the same now as they were centuries ago; the prosecution of 
pirates and trying to create a prosecutorial system in a lawless country has 
become problematic, just as it was centuries ago; and the approach to the 
problem of sea piracy has been one of repeating past mistakes. This article 
will demonstrate that all of the economic and prosecutorial problems that 
exist today also existed hundreds of years ago.  
The resurgence of piracy is obviously due to the fact that it has become a 
financial success for the pirates and their backers. Now most of the 
countries are waiting to see what is going to happen to the relationship 
  
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Walter Menya, Kenya: Nation’s Neighbours Reluctant to Host Courts to Try 
Somali Pirates, ALL AFRICA (July 9, 2011), http://allafrica.com/stories/201107111497.html.   
 12. The Modalities, supra note 2, at 27. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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between pirates and the various extremist groups in Somalia. Can the 
relationship of extremists and organized crime syndicates with pirates 
become so successful that nobody in the country of Somalia will be able to 
stop it? Will piracy develop in the same manner as the South American drug 
trade in the 1970s, a relatively small-time operation turning into a huge 
global crisis? These are some of the questions that this article is going to 
explore. 
This discussion will commence with a look at some of the highlights of 
piracy that existed centuries ago. 
II. THE CLASSICAL PERIOD OF PIRACY 
When Professor Dubner became interested in writing about piracy it was 
because he had thought that the crime had disappeared from the face of the 
earth. He wrote the first book on International Law of Sea Piracy over 30 
years ago.15 At that time, the main source of material was a 1932 study by 
the Harvard Research Group.16  The group proposed draft articles on the 
subject of sea piracy and concluded that they were going to prepare the draft 
articles (later adopted in the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)) in an expeditious 
manner, because the crime itself had long ago been forgotten and was 
insignificant.17  
The classical or “golden age” of piracy, when pirates were at their 
strongest and sea piracy was at its height, extended from the 1660s to the 
1730s.18 According to Defoe, “[t]his was at a Time that the Pyrates had 
obtained such an Acquisition of Strength, that they were in no concern 
about preserving themselves from the Justice of Laws.”19 Everybody has 
heard about Blackbeard (his real name being Edward Teach or possibly 
“Tech,” etc.), Bartholomew Roberts and others. One of the most interesting 
facts that could be related to piracy off of Somalia is that a sample of about 
700 active pirates in the Caribbean between 1715 and 1725 was composed 
of different and mixed descent, ranging from American, West Indian, 
Swedish, Dutch, and others.20  Not only were they of different nationalities, 
but they were also racially diverse.21 “Based on data available from 23 
  
 15. BARRY HART DUBNER, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA PIRACY (1980). 
 16. See Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with 
Comment, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. SUPP. 739 (1932). 
 17. Id. at 787 (“It is expediency that should be the chief guide in the formulation of a 
convention.”). 
 18. See, e.g., BRITISH PIRACY IN THE GOLDEN AGE: HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION, 
1660-1730 (Joel H. Baer ed., 2007) (citing the years 1660-1730). 
 19. DANIEL DEFOE, A GENERAL HISTORY OF THE PYRATES 87 (Manuel Schonhorn ed., 
Courier Dover Pub’ns 1999) (1724).  
 20. Peter T. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization, 
115 J.POL. ECON 1049, 1054 (2007) [hereinafter Leeson, An-arrgh-chy].  
 21. Id. 
750 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:3 
pirate crews active between 1682 and 1726, the racial composition of ships 
varied between 13 and 98 percent black.” 22 If this sample is representative, 
then 25-30 percent of the average pirates were of “African descent.”23 This 
is an important statistic because one of the arguments against attacking 
pirates ashore, which was made at the Harvard meeting that Professor 
Dubner attended in December 2009, was the fact that many of the countries 
that were trying to thwart piracy today, are composed of Caucasians and are 
usually Christian, whereas the Somalians are mostly people of color and 
Muslim. Today, the international community does not want to appear as 
though it is starting a racial or religious crusade over the crime of piracy. It 
will be demonstrated later in this essay that the economics of piracy requires 
an understanding of the religious dimension involved because Hawawal, 
which is an informal money transfer system used almost solely by Muslims, 
is also the primary system pirates use to launder ransom payments.24   
In the classical period the total number of pirates that existed according 
to pirate historians “[b]etween 1716 and 1722 . . . were between 1,000-
2,000 sea bandits.”25 In an interesting footnote, Leeson pointed out that the 
“Royal Navy averaged only 13,000 men in any one year between 1716 and 
1726, making the pirate population in a good year more than 15 percent of 
the navy population.”26 In 1680, the total population of the American 
colonies was less than 152,000 according to Leeson.27 In fact, as late as 
1790 when the first U.S. census was taken, only 24 places in the country 
had a population greater of 2,500.28 
Unlike today where Somali pirates go out on skiffs and make use of 
mother ships, the average crew size, between the period of 1716 and 1726, 
was about 80 members.29 Some pirate crews were close to 120 members and 
crews of 150 to 200 were not uncommon.” 30 Several pirate crews were 
reported to be bigger than this. For example, Leeson notes that 
“Blackbeard’s crew aboard the Queen Anne’s Revenge was 300 men.”31 
  
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. (citing KENNETH J. KINKOR, BLACK MEN UNDER THE BLACK FLAG, IN BANDITS 
AT SEA: A PIRATES READER, 195, 200-01 (C.R. Pennell ed., 2001)). 
 24. See Hawala System, GLOBAL JIHAD, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp? 
id=1171 (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 25. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1054 (citation omitted). 
 26. Id. at 1054 n.14 (citing REDIKER, supra note 28, at 256).  
 27. Id. (citing JONATHAN HUGHES & LOUIS P. CAIN, AMERICAN ECONOMIC HISTORY 
20 (4th ed. 1994)). 
 28. Id. (citing HUGHES & CAIN, supra note 30, at 28). 
 29. Id. at 1054 (citing REDIKER, supra note 29, at 256). 
 30. Id. at 1054-55. 
 31. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1055 (quoting DAVID CORDINGLY, 
UNDER THE BLACK FLAG: THE ROMANCE AND THE REALITY OF LIFE AMONG THE PIRATES 165-
66 (2006)). “[A] sixth-rate Royal Navy ship in the early eighteenth century carried more 
crew members than the average pirate vessel (about 150). . . . Furthermore, some pirate 
crews were too large to fit in one ship. . . .[and would form] squadrons.” Id. at 1055 (citation 
omitted). Professor Leeson gives as an example Captain Bartholomew Roberts commanding 
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Apparently, many of the multiple pirate ships joined concerted plundering 
expeditions, for example: 
The most impressive fleets of sea bandits belong to the buccaneers. . . . 
Captain Morgan commanded a fleet of 37 ships and 2,000 men sufficient 
to attack coastal communities on the Spanish Main. 32  
Ships joining into fleets or becoming fleets apparently was nothing out 
of the ordinary in those days. The manner in which pirate organizations 
operate today is comparable to the way pirates operated in the classical 
period. Much like today, pirates in the classical period did not acquire their 
ships by purchase or otherwise; they stole them.33 It has not been 
uncommon for pirates off of Somalia to steal a fishing vessel, for example, 
and use it as a mother ship. Naturally, all the pirates followed the basic rule 
of “‘no prey, no pay.’”34 As will be seen later in this paper, the amount of 
pay and how it is divided is very similar to the way things are done today. 
For example, after they captured a ship “[t]he hunters’ pay will generally be 
200 pieces of eight; the carpenter, for his work . . ., would be paid 100 to 
150 pieces of eight; the surgeon would receive 200 or 250 for his medical 
supplies.”35 Pirates even had a set amount for the loss of limb or other 
injuries. For a loss of the right arm, (i.e., 600 pieces of eight or six slaves); 
for a left arm 500 pieces of eight or five slaves; “the left leg was 400 and 
four slaves; an eye 100 or one slave and the same award was made for the 
loss of a finger.”36 Also, articles of piracy (i.e., a chasse-partie) would set 
forth all of the “duty” among the officers and crews.37 In addition to the 
above amounts, which were withdrawn from the capital:  
[T]he rest of the prize would be divided into as many portions as men on 
the ship. The  captain draws four or five men’s portions for the use of the 
ship, perhaps even more, and  two portions for himself. The rest of the 
men share uniformly, and the boys get half a  man’s share.38   
  
a squadron of four ships to carry 508 men. Id. (citing CORDINGLY, supra, at 111, 165-66); 
REDIKER, supra note 28 at 107. 
 32. Id. (citing ALEXANDER O. EXQUEMELIN, THE BUCCANEERS OF AMERICA 171 
(Alexis Brown trans., Dover 2000) (1678).  
 33. Id. at 1064. “There is at least one eighteenth-century pirate, however, Stede 
Bonnet, who actually purchased the first ship he went on the account with.” Id. n.30. 
 34. Id. at 1070. (“The buccaneers called their articles a chasse-partie. These articles 
specified the division of booty among the officers and crew along with other terms of the 
buccaneers’ organization. All sea bandits followed the basic rule of ‘no prey, no pay.’ Unless 
a pirating expedition was successful, no man received any payment.”).  
 35. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20 (quoting EXQUEMELIN, supra note 35, at 
71-72).  
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 1069-70. 
 38. Id. at 1070. See also id. at 1076 (“The evidence also suggests that piratical 
articles were successful in preventing internal conflict and creating order aboard pirate ships. 
Pirates, it appears, strictly adhered to their articles.”).  
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Piratical organization in the classical period also received a significant 
sum from their plunder: 
At a time when Anglo-American seamen on a trading voyage to 
Madagascar were collecting less than twelve pounds sterling a year . . . the 
deep-water pirates could realize a hundred or even a thousand times more . 
. . The amount of money was rather enormous. In 1695, for example, 
Henry Every’s pirate fleet captured a prize carrying more than £600,000 in 
precious metals and jewels. The resulting share-out earned each member 
of his crew £1,000, the equivalent of nearly 80 years [sic]’ income for an 
able merchant seaman at the time. In the early eighteenth century, Captain 
John Bowen’s pirate crew plundered a prize ‘which yielded them 500 
[pounds] per Man. Several years later, Captain Thomas White’s crew 
retired to Madagascar after a marauding expedition each pirate having 
earned £1,200 from the cruise. In 1720, Captain Christopher Condent’s 
crew seized a prize that earned each pirate £3,000. In 1721, Captain John 
Taylor and Oliver La Bouche’s pirate consort earned an astonishing 
£4,000 for each crew member from a single attack.  Even the small pirate 
crew, captained by John Evens in 1722 took enough booty to split ‘nine 
thousand Pounds among thirty Persons’—or £300 a pirate. To put these 
earnings in perspective, compare them to the able merchant seaman’s 
wage over the same period. Between 1689 and 1740 this varied from 25 to 
55 shillings per month, a meager £15 to £33 per year. 39 
It will be shown that these figures are comparable to the figures that exist 
for Somali pirates today. For example, a Somali pirate today can earn 
between $168,630 and $394,200 in the course of five years, whereas their 
next best alternative yields a meager $14,500 over their entire life time.40 
One important fact that can be learned from reviewing classical pirate 
profits is that “[p]irate crew members—the piratical firm’s employees—
jointly owned and operated the piratical firm.”41 Sound familiar? This is 
because there have been numerous studies regarding the amount and 
structure of ownership and funding of pirates today. Pirates today operate 
through external funding, which comes from different sources, including the 
  
 39. Id. at 1077-78 (citation omitted) (Konstam’s original text states that £1,000 is the 
equivalent of nearly 80 years’ income for an able merchant seaman, whereas Leeson, in 
quoting Konstam, stated £1,000 is the equivalent of nearly 40 years income). In 1932 John 
Robert Moore, an American scholar of Daniel Defoe published his theory that Charles 
Johnson was really Daniel Defoe writing under his pen name. Moore’s argument was so 
persuasive that most libraries catalogued Johnson’s books under Defoe’s name for the next 
50 years. Leeson cites Charles Johnson throughout his publication, however many of  
Leeson’s references may possibly be catalogued under Daniele Defoe. See e.g., BARB KARG 
& ARJEAN , THE EVERYTHING PIRATES BOOK: A SWASHBUCKLING HISTORY OF ADVENTURE ON 
THE HIGH SEAS 223 (Adams Media, 2007).           
 40. See GEOPOLICITY, infra note 62, at iv. 
 41. Peter T. Leeson, The Invisible Hook: The Law and Economics of Pirate 
Tolerance, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 139, 151 (2009) [hereinafter Leeson, The Invisible 
Hook]. 
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underworld.42 In the classical period, however, pirates did not require 
external financiers, for “each employee of the piratical firm was nearly a 
partner: a near-equal firm-owner with an equal say in firm activities, such as 
whether the crew would continue on the account (or retire), who would lead 
the crew, and so on.”43 In the classical period the pirate pay scale was 
extremely flat, the difference between the highest and lowest paid person 
was only a single share.”44  
In contrast, modern day pirates have a large disparity within their pay 
scale. The stark difference in the pay scales of pirates and their backers 
allows the top commanding backer to receive nearly one hundred times 
more than a bottom level employee.45 Journalist Jay Bahadur, in an article 
titled “Pirates Inc.,” described one instance of this payment structure.46 Mr. 
Bahadur’s article focused on the pirates that captured crewmembers aboard 
the MV Victoria.47 The Pirates ransom payment was distributed as follows:48 
 
Position   Salary  
Officers 
  
 
Commander-in-chief, Financial Backer $900,000   
“Computer” 
 
 
Interpreter Loyanne $60,000   
Accountant Mustuku $60,000   
Supplies logistics officer $30,000  
“Commander of the Khat” 
  
 
Attackers   
  
 
First to board the MV Victoria  $150,000 
Mohamad Abdi (plus Land Cruiser bonus) 
Eight others $41,000 each 
Cooks   
  
 
Head Chef $20,000   
Sous-chef $9,000   
Holders   
  
 
20 men   $12,000 each 
TOTAL   ~$1,800,000  
                            
  
 42. See, e.g., Rob Walker, Inside Story of Somali Pirate Attack, BBC NEWS (June 4, 
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8080098.stm.  
 43. Leeson, The Invisible Hook, supra note 41, at 151. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Jay Bhadur, Pirates, Inc., FIN. TIMES (London), June 23, 2010, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e5f60614-7d23-11df-8845-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1x3TabtjB. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. M.V. Victoria was hijacked by eight pirates in the Gulf of Aden on May 5, 
2009 while on its way to the Saudi port of Jeddah. One million, eight hundred thousand 
dollars in ransom was paid. The table shows how the ransom payment was divided. Id. 
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After discussing what each pirate received, Mr. Bahadur stated: 
As in any pyramid scheme, the clear winner was the man on the top. 
Computer was  responsible for supplying start-up capital worth roughly 
$40,000, which went toward the  attack boat, outboard motors, weapons, 
food and fuel. For this investment he received  half of the total ransom, or 
$900,000. After subtracting the operating expenses of  $230,000 that the 
group incurred during the Victoria’s captivity in Eyl, Computer’s return 
 on the investment would have been enviable 1,600 per cent.49 
The hijacking of the MV Victoria, which amounted to a ransom payment 
of $1.8 million, represents a small part of the greater pirate industry that 
causes over $12 billion of damage annually.50 Because of this, we now turn 
to the statistics provided by two recent economic studies which show in 
detail the financial impact of piracy on the international community. 
III. THE PRESENT DAY ECONOMICS OF SEA PIRACY AND THE COST TO THE 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY  
A. Background 
During the meeting at the Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, 
one of the main concerns expressed was the fact that piracy had changed 
over the years from the simple theft of a ship’s money or of a ship to a 
criminal industry backed by organized crime. There, in December 2009, it 
was estimated that “[a]bout 1,500 pirates were involved, with 7 syndicates 
and fewer ‘bosses’ controlling separate but linked enterprises [that are] 
largely financed and brokered from Kenya, Dubai, Lebanon, Somalia, and 
elsewhere.”51 Although Russia was mentioned, nothing was shown at the 
time that indicated that the Russian mafia was involved.52 A chart 
concerning finances (“the money paper trail”) was introduced at this 
meeting, as follows: 
 
 
 
  
 49. Bhadur, supra note 45.  
 50. See, e.g., Anna Bowden et al., The Economic Cost of Maritime Piracy 25 (One 
Earth Future, Working Paper, Dec. 2010), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/ 
sites/default/files/documents_old/The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_Full_Report.pdf. “The 
main direct costs of piracy, [include] the cost of ransoms, piracy insurance premiums, 
deterrent equipment, re-routing vessels away from piracy risk zones, naval deployments in 
piracy hot zones, piracy prosecutions, and organization budgets dedicated to reducing 
piracy.” Id. 
 51. ROTBERG, supra note 1, at 3. 
 52. Id. 
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FINANCING  LAUNDERING 
 
              
Enablers53   
 
Thereafter, in July 2011, a report was issued by the Financial Action 
Task Force Groupe d’action Financiére (FATF*GAFI).54 The FATF “is an 
independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes policies 
to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist 
financing.”55 The report was broken up into two parts: maritime piracy for 
ransom (MPR) and kidnapping for ransom (KFR).56 One of the more 
interesting points made by the study was as follows: 
With ransom demands and payments for the release of vessels and 
hostages escalating,  there appears to be a definite link to money flows 
related to both those who are financing  piracy and the proceeds of this 
criminal activity. Despite this, international maritime operations involving 
  
 53. Id. 
 54. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, ORGANIZED MARITIME PIRACY AND RELATED 
KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM (2011), available at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/40/ 
13/48426561.pdf [hereinafter FATF Report]. 
 55. Id. at 2. 
 56. Id. at 3. The Report contained, for example, case studies concerning the financial 
aspects of maritime piracy for ransom. The executive summary contains a statement saying 
that this is the “first comprehensive picture” of maritime piracy for ransom (as well as 
kidnapping for ransom) and their “attempts to outline the financial implications to these 
activities” as well as the work to be done in the future. Id. at 5. 
*Al-
Shabaab 
 
 
 
Community  
(Local-e.g.; 
The 
Haradere 
cooperative 
 
*Organized 
Crime 
Syndicates 
 
*Diaspora 
Community 
*Al-
Shabaab; 
Al-Qaeda 
(?) 
 
 
Community 
(Local and 
Regional-
Eastleigh) 
 
 
Diaspora 
Community 
 
 
Organized 
Crime 
Syndicate 
-Hijacking for 
  Ransom at Sea 
      -Private Security 
Firms   
-Negotiators                      
-Legal and Risk 
Advisors
Shipping and Insurance Firms 
756 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 20:3 
warships from dozens of countries remains the primary response  against 
PFR.57  
If this is so, it is because the international community believes that 
stopping the acts of piracy at these stages should take priority due to the 
number of sailors that are being held for ransom as well as being killed and 
tortured. Also, industry professionals who deal with the payment of ransoms 
have little interest in insisting on the understanding of where the monies are 
being distributed. What they are more interested in is getting the vessels 
back.58  
The FAFT report shows that within the past few years the piracy for 
ransom situation has grown rapidly: 
In 2010, hijackings off the coast of Somalia resulted in 49 vessels captured 
and 1016 hostages taken, as well as eight fatalities. Another four vessels 
with 165 crew members were hijacked elsewhere in the world. As of 3 
March 2011, 33 vessels were being held, including one that was converted 
to use as a pirate “mother ship.” A total of 711 were also being held. In the 
first two months of 2011, seven fatalities resulted from PFR-related 
attacks.59  
As this is going on, “[r]ansoms are rising exponentially, having increased 
from an average of $150,000 per vessel/crew accrued in 2005 to an 
estimated $5.2 million per vessels/crew in 2010.”60 “[A]pproximately 
USD180-238 million were reportedly paid in ransoms in 2010. The total 
  
 57. Id. at 7 (emphasis added). The result of this report is that the piracy off the coast 
of Somalia, is creating major problems for the international community: inter alia, “money 
laundering/proceeds” and the “multi-dimensional threat to financial systems, including . . .[ ] 
shipping costs, inflation of insurance premiums for vessels and cargos, freedom of commerce 
on the high seas, and the rise in ransom payments themselves.” Id. 
 58. Id. “One of the most spectacular increases in the costs of piracy in recent years 
has been the increasing price of ransoms paid to release hijacked ships. Ransoms are 
generally sought by Somali pirates. Pirates in other regions have more often stolen the vessel 
or cargo, rather than ransoming the value of the seafarers’ lives and their ship. In November 
2010, the highest ransom on record, $9.5 million, was paid to Somali pirates to release the 
Samho Dream, a South Korean oil tanker. Indeed, 2010 set a remarkable record for the cost 
of ransoms, with the year kicking off to a $7 million ransom paid in January to release the 
Greek supertanker MV Maran Centaurus, which had been carrying $162 million of crude oil 
from Saudi Arabia to the United States.” FATF Report, supra note 51 at 9. FATF 
emphasized that if a pirate organization knows an individual, business, or other entity is 
willing to pay ransoms, the greater the likelihood that those who pay will be targeted again. 
Id. Also, “the more companies are willing to pay regularly, the more lucrative piracy as a 
business becomes. Today insurance costs have skyrocketed to the point that some companies 
would rather take a chance sailing through pirate-ridden waters and pay ransoms than 
repeatedly pay monumental premiums.” Mayann Lawlor, Signal Magazine, Piracy Threatens 
Global Economy (June 2010), available at http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/ 
Signal_Article_Template.asp?articleid=2304&zoneid=285. 
 59. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 7-8 (footnote omitted). 
 60. Id. at 8. 
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cost of PFR-related incidents, including vessel-related cost, depreciation 
and spoilage of goods, together with increased cost to manufacturers, 
shipping companies, maritime insurers, labor cost were estimated to be 
[USD] 7-12 billion per annum.”61 
Consistent with the economic studies presented in the FATF Report, in 
May 2011, the following table was presented by Geopolicity:62 
 
HEADLINES (Based on Available Data):63 
 
Low/High Pirate income (2010): 
Using 1,500 Pirates 
~US$33,000-US$79,000/year 
Potential Lifetime Earnings (2010: 
Using 1,500 Pirates 
~US$168,000 US $394,000 
 
Next Best Alternative:  ~US$500/year 
Pirates Incomes Compared to 
Average Income: 
~67-157 higher 
No. Pirates Could Double by: ~2016 
Total Cost of Piracy 2010: ~US$4.9-8.3 billion 
Projected Increase by 2014: ~US$13-15 billion 
Major Stakeholders:  Financiers, Sponsors, Officials, Pirates, 
Maritime Insurers, Security Companies, 
Navies, Merchant Marine 
 
 
In the economic model, Geopolicity assesses the cost and benefits of 
international piracy and creates a “value chain” where the  
[g]reatest rates of return on international counter pirate investment and 
policy are to be found. The model includes [a]: i) a cost-benefit analysis at 
the individual pirate level, based on existing socioeconomic and market 
data ii) the aggregate cost- benefit analysis at the international systems 
level[,] and iii) comprehensive data on the resurgence of piracy by 
  
 61. Id. (footnotes omitted). In calculating the total damage that piracy has caused to 
the international community it is also important to note that  
[t]he total cost of ransom is estimated to be around double the value actually paid to pirates. 
The total cost is duplicated by a number of factors, such as: the cost of negotiations, 
psychological trauma counseling, repair to ship damage caused while it is held captive, and 
the physical delivery of the ransom money, often done by helicopter or private plane. Finally, 
large costs result from ships being held and out of service. For instance, it costs around $3 
million for a cargo ship to be held for two months at a charter hire rate of $50,000 per day. 
Bowden, supra note 50, at 9-10 (footnotes omitted). 
 62. GEOPOLICITY, THE ECONOMICS OF PIRACY: PIRATE RANSOMS & LIVELIHOODS OFF 
THE COAST OF SOMALIA (2011), available at http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/ 
geopolicity_-_the_economics_of_piracy_-_pirates__livelihoods_off_the_coast_of_somalia.pdf. 
 63. Id. at cover page. 
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functional classification sovereign jurisdiction . . . [which] include[s] 
trend, comparator, and predictive analysis.64  
Geopolicity also made what they called an “executive summary outline” 
which it hoped would benefit the CGPCS.65 In the summary and subsequent 
study, Geopolicity estimates the cost of piracy to the international 
community as between $4.9-8.3 billion in 2010.66 It foresees estimates of 
$13-15 billion by the year 2015.67 The report also states that the income to 
pirates off the coast of Somalia alone in 2010 was between $75-238 million 
and could rise to $200-400 million by 2015.68 “Assuming only 1,500 active 
pirates exist off the coa[s]ts of Somalia, a pirate can expect to earn between 
$168,630 and $394,200 over a theoretical five-year career.”69 If these 
individuals were not pirates they could hope to earn, at best, approximately 
$14,500 over their entire working life.70 This “report also runs scenarios 
based on 3,000 pirates.”71 It predicts that the amount of increase in the 
number of pirates will jump from 200 to 400 in an annual rate based on 
present demand assumptions.72 By the time this study by Geopolicity was 
written, “[t]he expansion of global piracy incidents . . . increased from 276 
in 2005 to 445 in 2010 (219 of which were off the coast of Somalia).”73 
“This [number] could increase to more than 600 incidents by 2015, based on 
the application of supply/demand and opportunity cost theory.”74 The study 
suggests that the significant proportion of proceeds (between forty and fifty 
percent) are transferred out of Somalia using informant money transfer 
systems, presenting a vulnerability to the Anti-Money Laundering/ 
Countering the Finance of Terrorism (AML/CFT) system.75  
As a result of this data, Geopolicity proposes a 3-phase independent 
economic research program which includes: strengthening and overcoming 
data paucity constraints; producing quarterly updates for the international 
community; undertaking country level financial tracking and sponsorship 
research; strengthening the understanding of the entire value chain; and 
  
 64. Id. at iv. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at iv, 9. 
 67. Geopolicity, supra note 62, at iv. 
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. The figures are comparable to that of the classical period where a small pirate 
crew could take £300 in one expedition whereas the next best alternative was £15 to £33 per 
year. Leeson, An-arrgh-chy, supra note 20, at 1078. 
 71. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. The International Maritime Bureau Piracy Reporting Centre on June 7, 2012 
indicated, 157 worldwide incidents, of which 61 were off the Coast of Somalia. See Piracy 
News & Figures, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVICES, http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-
reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures (last visited Jun. 10, 2012). 
 74. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv. 
 75. Id.  
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developing a framework of corrective measures that focus on policy, 
institutional, security sector reform, law enforcement, prevention, and 
systems monitoring.76  
An interesting point that the Geopolicity study raises is that the origins of 
piracy off the coast of Somalia can be traced back to the political, economic, 
and social unrest, which characterized Somalia in the mid-1990s.77 It also 
points out that in the absence of a functioning central government, some 
Somali fishermen assumed the role of protecting Somali waters from both 
illegal dumping of waste by foreigners as well as over-fishing.78 The report 
calls these vigilante activities, which has led to selecting piracy as a way to 
supplement livelihoods.79 Additionally, it also points out that there are few 
legal alternatives for some of these impoverished Somalis.80 Some authors 
have suggested that Somalia may be better off stateless and set forth before 
and after scenarios to demonstrate their point, which to the authors, is 
simply ridiculous.81  
The main problem is that the crime of international sea piracy is 
becoming institutionalized with respect to entrenched organization 
structures and self-financing mechanisms.82 There have been suggestions of 
linkages between pirates and terrorist groups, but that connect has not been 
determined definitively.83 Piracy has been considered haram (forbidden) 
under Islam, yet there are many anecdotes of Somali pirates paying 
“docking fees” and “taxes” to Al-Shabaab and possibly to other Islamic 
terrorist groups.84 There was a report by a foreign press in February 2011, 
indicating that al-Shabaab ordered pirates in central Somalia to provide a 
cut of twenty percent of their profits to the terrorist group.85 When the 
pirates refused to do so, al-Shabaab reportedly detained four of the pirates’ 
  
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 8. 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. (citing U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PIRACY REPORT (2011), available at 
www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa.piracy.c32662.htm). 
 81. Because Somalia has been able to improve its performance on a number of 
human development indicators despite the absence of government leads authors to formulate 
arguments that suggest Somali is better off stateless. The fact of the matter is Somalia has 
endured two decades of war, beset by droughts and now the only lucrative opportunity in that 
region is piracy. The cash brought in through piracy may cause some economic growth, but 
at what cost? A state run by terrorists and organized crime syndicates is by no means better 
than a state which functions through an elected government. See, e.g., Peter T. Leeson, Better 
Off Stateless: Somalia Before and After Government Collapse, 35 J. COMP. ECON. 689 
(2007). 
 82. Bahadur, supra note 45. 
 83. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 9. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
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investors.86 Thankfully, in December 2011, Islamist militants were ousted 
from the Somali capital, Mogadishu, and U.N. officials viewed this event as 
a brief window of opportunity to set up a working government in Somalia.87 
The worry, nevertheless, still remains that piracy will continue to be an 
“attractive option to [certain] terrorist groups in the future.”88 
B. Analyzing the ‘Money Trail’ of Present Day Sea Piracy  
In order to restrain the growth of Somali Piracy, the Geopolicity group 
points out that the key focus of future research should be in, “(i) the 
payment of money and laundering of ransom payments (ii) asset tracing (iii) 
where relevant informal money transfer systems (iv) pirate value chain 
analysis . . . “89 In addition, the important fact to be considered is that the 
ransom payment can be collected and consolidated anywhere in the world.90 
The payments made for the release of crews and vessels can also be spent 
and converted into different types of financial instruments, or used to 
purchase real property and other fixed assets in multiple jurisdictions as 
well:  
A common ratio that academic experts use in theorizing about the amount 
of PFR-related monies remaining in Somalia versus the amount leaving 
there is 60/40. However, even if indeed “only” 40% of ransom proceeds 
leave Somalia, the actual and potential exploitation of the financial sector 
by those who commit and support PFR globally still represents a money 
laundering and terrorist financing threat. For example, based on the USD 
238 million in ransoms reportedly paid to Somali pirates in 2010, 
approximately USD 95 million would comprise the 40% sent out of the 
country. This is a significant amount of illicit finance relative to the region 
that could enter the international financial system in a variety of 
jurisdictions. . . . 91 
The Report of the FATF also shows that there are three basic means of 
financing the piracy industry.92 In all three cases, the pirate leader is well-
connected and a person respected in the community, and is thus able to 
draw upon his personal network for protection and problem solving: 
  
 86. Id. The link between piracy and terrorism can also include the sale or transfer of 
hostages to terrorist groups. See, e.g., Abdalle Ahmed, Somalia: British Couple Held 
Hostage in Harardhere Transferred to Unknown Location, Pirate Says, RBC RADIO (Apr. 
29, 2010, 01:52 PM), http://www.raxanreeb.com/dev/2010/04/somalia-british-couple-held-
hostage-in-harardhere-transferred-to-unknown-location-pirate-says/. 
 87. See Somalia’s Rare Window of Hope, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16156157. 
 88. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 10. 
 89. GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at 13.  
 90. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 10. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 17. 
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1. A cottage industry structure in which the whole operation is owned 
by a single funder. He may lead the group, and, if the hijacking is 
successful, takes the largest share of the ransom payment. 
2. A shareholder or cooperative structure in which individual pirates 
invest in the operation and share the PRF proceeds. Each pirate is equipped 
with his own weapon and other gear, and supplies his own food and other 
necessities. The boat is owned by a member of each “cooperative.” 
3. A syndicate or committee structure formed by several investors. 
Syndicates are responsible for the majority of hijackings. They arm and 
equip several pirate groups and draw up contracts for PFR operations and 
the distribution of ransom payments. Successful syndicates can command as 
much as a 50 per cent share of a ransom payment.93  
Of the three forms of financing piracy, the syndicate model, according to 
the FATF, has generated the most amount of interest.94 Today, shares in a 
given syndicate can cost between five to ten thousand dollars each.95  
The committee may have direct access to the pirate leadership, or may 
choose to . . . use a facilitator to transport the funds to the pirate group. An 
agreement specifies the amount of money they are collectively providing; 
usually has the name of the individual receiving this money and how much 
the investors require as a return.96  
The pirates will issue two types of shares in the venture: “A” shares, in 
which the individual receives a percentage of the ransom, and are reserved 
for investors, pirate leaders and the successful pirate crew; and “B” shares, 
which entitle the individual to a fixed fee.97 The report indicates that “A” 
shares generally go to investors, pirate leadership and pirate crew, and “B” 
shares are paid to individuals with singular tasks such as armed guards, 
interpreters, and middlemen.98 This investor scheme setup also displays 
characteristics similar to those employed in conventional organized crime.99  
  
 93. Id.  
 94. Id.  
 95. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 17. One report indicated that at present, it costs 
investors approximately six thousand dollars to send a team of pirates out searching for ships 
to hijack. This money goes toward the purchase of food, ammunition, and fuel and the rental 
of rocket-propelled grenade launchers and speedboats.  Even though it costs investors six 
thousand dollars to send a team of pirates, each investor must be prepared to fund several 
failed attempts. When an investor’s team succeeds, the investor receives upwards of thirty 
percent of the total ransom. Walker, supra note 52. Based on this report, an investment of 
approximately 40 thousand to one hundred thousand dollars can bring in millions of dollars 
profit. Because of the potential payoff for investors piracy is turning into an extremely 
lucrative enterprise. 
 96. FATF Report, supra note 54.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Id.  
 99. Id.  
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Accompanying the distribution of shares schematic, the FAFT Report 
indicates that in 2006 the estimated total ransom money paid to Somali 
pirates was $5 million in 2006; $25 million in 2007; $70 million in 2008; 
$80 million in 2009 and $180 million in 2010. 100  
Even the type of notes that comprise the ransom payment differ from 
“USD 100 notes (90%); USD 50 notes (7%) and in USD 20 notes (3%). 
Eighty percent of the ransoms are delivered by airdrop as it entails less risk 
than any other method . . . . [M]any experts believe that a significant 
amount of the money—from 40-60%—never leaves Somalia. Proportions 
of the profits are offered to various groups, including [t]he initial investors, 
payments to local clan chiefs and militia, reinvesting in weapons and 
equipment, payments to the pirates’ leader and the other pirates, both the 
initial hijackers as well as the guards. 101  
The report goes on to indicate that the proceeds of piracy have been used 
to purchase real estate in Puntland as well as areas in Kenya such as 
Eastleigh in Mombasa.102 
In addition, the report has set forth various case studies in order to 
illustrate not only the brazen nature of Somali piracy but also the somewhat 
uncoordinated nature of the international community in detecting, 
interdicting, and deterring hijacking.103 The report claims that the 
“disjointed nature of cooperation between shipping companies, maritime 
insurance underwriters, law enforcement, financial intelligence units, and 
post-incident investigators in sharing information” ultimately leads to the 
inability to follow the financial trail pirates almost always leave behind.104 
One of the conclusions of the case study is that the “Somali pirates are 
becoming ‘[i]ncreasingly reliant on the international financial system and 
other money service provider to move cash off-shore [in order] to finance 
other activities.’”105  
The report also demonstrates the generic typology for PFR operations off 
the coast of Somalia:  
[A] vessel is seized, the owner or management company is contacted, and 
a ransom payment is negotiated, often by third party intermediaries. The 
insurance company of the hijacked vessel then arranges for a cash 
payment. The cash is obtained from a financial institution, which may be 
the insurance company itself, and packaged for delivery, often being 
  
 100. Id. at 18. “The actual figures are assumed to be higher than these, because the 
shipping industry does not always report the total ransom amounts accurately.” FATF 
Report, supra note 54, at 18. 
 101. FATF Report, supra note 54.  
 102. Id. at 19. 
 103. See generally FATF Report, supra note 54, at 11-12. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 13. 
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airdropped to a prearranged location. These payments seem to demonstrate 
two money laundering/terrorist financing vulnerabilities: that these 
payments often do not result in bulk cash disclosures/declarations and/or 
suspicious transaction reporting to the FIUs [Financial Intelligence Unit]. 
This occurs either because jurisdictions lack these requirements and/or 
those facilitating the payments of ransoms are successfully evading these 
reporting requirements. Once ransoms are paid and the cash subsequently 
enters Somalia, “following the money” becomes difficult because there are 
no mechanisms to identify the source and destination of these funds and 
because the trail goes cold if such payments were not previously reported 
to FIUs and other AML/ CFT authorities.106 
Rather than the typical classical situation where pirates buried their loot 
on some remote, usually uninhabited island, or tendered over a percentage 
of it to the government that was sponsoring them, the Somali piracy 
situation presents the need for targeting financial activity of pirates, 
especially their financiers and instigators, through the freezing and seizure 
of assets, and the confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of 
piracy.107 This method  
[c]ould help to (1) disrupt financial support to pirate organizations, (2) 
track and seize (either through post-conviction or non-conviction based 
forfeiture, depending on the jurisdiction) assets enabling pirate operations, 
(3) prevent pirates from using the international banking system and other 
formal financial systems, and (4) prevent pirates  from using cash couriers 
and other informal-value transfer mechanisms to transmit funds. . . . 108 
One of the most important findings is that  
[o]ne of the most challenging conditions is the lack of capacity in the 
regions where piracy occurs. In particular, Somalia has no formal 
authorities or structures to implement an AML, and Puntland is known for 
its complicity. The countries surrounding Somalia are characterized by 
lack of capacity: Kenya has no FIU [Financial Intelligence Unit] and has 
not begun implementation of its ALM law. The AML/CFT regimes of 
Ethiopia, Seychelles, Yemen, and Tanzania are in varying degrees of 
development and implementation while, Uganda does not have an ALM 
law at all. 109  
  
 106. Id. Note that FIU stands for Financial Intelligence Unit, AML stands for Anti-
Money Laundering, and CFT stands for Countering the Finance of Terrorism. 
 107. Id. at 20. 
 108. Id.  
 109. FATF Report, supra note 54, at 22. 
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This is particularly alarming because these regions account for the 
majority of piracy prosecutions today.110 “Even in countries [that have a] 
traditionally higher capacity including countries that have a cursory 
ALM/CFT regime, there is a lack of consistency regarding bulk cash 
reporting, interdiction and investigation, hawala money server business 
regulation, reporting regimes and investigation.”111  
Where does this all lead us? In terms of the “number of [s]tates 
prosecuting acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia in their courts,” the 
statistics show that the number of participating courts has risen from [ten] to 
[twenty]; and the total number of prosecutions taking place has nearly 
doubled from 528 to 1,011.”112 Kenya alone has convicted 119 pirates and 
Somalia, surprisingly has, according to U.N. data, tried 290 pirates in 
Puntland and convicted 240 of them.113 In Somaliland, there were 94 trials 
and 68 convictions, and in South Central Somalia there were eighteen trials 
held.114 Altogether, approximately 20 states have tried pirates, and over 
1,000 trials have been held since the date of this U.N. report.115 Much of the 
international resources, which are being spent today are used to arrest and 
prosecute pirates through international naval operations. By allocating the 
majority of resources to prosecuting pirates at sea, less emphasis has been 
placed on prosecution through the tracing of the ransom payments. Given 
the syndicate nature of piracy and the fact that nearly 50% of the ransom is 
  
 110. See, e.g., Press Release, Security Council, Human Cost of Piracy Off Somalia 
Coast ‘Incalculable’, Full Range of Legal. Preventative Measures Needed To Thwart 
Attacks, Security Council Told, U.N. Doc. SC/10551 (Feb. 22, 2012).  
 111. Id. at 22. Hawala (also known as hundi) is an informal money transfer system, 
used almost solely by Muslims, based on performance and honor of a huge network of 
money brokers who are primarily located in the Muslim World — Middle East, Africa 
and Asia. Hawala has its origins in classic Islamic Law — the Sharia — and is mentioned in 
texts already as early as the 8th century. Hawala itself later influenced the development of 
the Western Common Law and Civil Law such as the French Aval (Avallo in Italian). In the 
most basic variant of the Hawala system, money is transferred via a network of Hawala 
brokers, or Hawaladars. A customer approaches a Hawala broker in one city and gives a 
sum of money to be transferred to a recipient in another, usually foreign, city. The Hawala 
broker calls another Hawala broker in the recipient’s city, gives disposition instructions of 
the funds (usually minus a small commission), and promises to settle the debt at a later date. 
The disposition is executed based solely of the mutual trust and credibility between the two 
brokers without any further documentation. As the system does not depend on the legal 
enforceability of claims, it can operate even in the absence of a legal and judicial 
environment. No records are produced of individual transactions — only a running tally of 
the amount owed by one broker to another is kept. Hawala is attractive to customers because 
it provides a fast and convenient transfer of funds, usually with a far lower commission than 
that charged by banks. Furthermore, the transfers are informal and not effectively regulated 
by governments, which is a major advantage to customers. Hawala is also an ideal system 
for laundering money for those who trust the system. See Hawala System, supra note 24.  
 112. The Modalities, supra note 2, at 27. 
 113. Id. at 27-28. 
 114. Id. at 28. 
 115. Id. 
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distributed to only a few individuals, the figures make it clear that finding 
the few individuals that invest in piracy can result in bringing down an 
entire operation. Because of this, reports such as those from Geopolicity 
explicitly state that it is vital to target piracy through the pirate value chain, 
concentrating on the payment of money, laundering of ransom payments, 
tracking of assets, and analyzing the informal (hawala) money transfer 
systems.116 
The next section explores the complexity of tracing ransom money. What 
is important to note is that there are two simultaneous streams of commerce 
in which pirate ransom money can be placed. Low level Somali pirates that 
collect ransom payments are likely to place their share of profits into their 
local economies, whereas piracy investors are more likely to divert funds 
through an intrinsic money laundering system. Interestingly, because of this 
dichotomy, financial analysts must employ two radically different strategies 
in attempting to trace the movement of ransom payments. Furthermore, 
tracing this ransom money also reveals lucid ways in which modern piracy 
is beginning to parallel piracy in the classical period. 
C. Tracing the Ransom Payments Made to Pirate Organizations 
Everybody agrees that the crime of piracy can only be stopped if the 
conditions in Somalia improve. Somalia has endured two decades of war, 
beset by drought and famine; it is now the home to both a lucrative piracy 
industry and Islamist militant groups.117 For this reason, Somalia is 
considered the ultimate failed state.118  
Today, piracy in Somalia is starting to develop into a mini-economy, 
which employs hundreds of people, all of whom share the ransom.119 
Reports indicate that piracy in “Somalia is attracting big-time criminals 
from all over the world.”120 As in the classical period, piracy today is a 
transnational crime, and the entity, i.e. Somalia, operates without rules, 
regulations or a functioning government.121 Because of this, “Somalis do not 
need to launder the money they make from piracy because their unique 
financial system operates on trust and honour, bypassing banks and other 
financial institutions.”122 The piratical financial system, hawala, does not 
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 117. See Somalia’s Rare Window of Hope, BBC NEWS (Dec. 13, 2011), 
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 119. Mary Harper, Chasing the Somali Piracy Money Trail, BBC NEWS (May 24, 
2009), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8061535.stm. 
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 121. Id. 
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cheating or killing each other. In the classic era pirates operated through a democratic style 
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involve documentation; most transactions are done verbally, so there is no 
paper trail.123 The hawala system also “makes it almost impossible to find 
out what happens to money made from ransom payments or any other 
transactions in Somalia.” [Furthermore,] the fact that most ransoms are paid 
in cash means they simply disappear into the Somali community, rather than 
ending up in banks or other financial bodies.”124 
Given the paucity and exceedingly opaque nature of the economic data 
involved in pirate transactions, analysts are beginning to use atypical 
methods for tracing the cash flow of ransom payments.125 For example, Anja 
Shorthand, from the Economics and Finance Department at Brunel 
University, has used province-level market data, nightlight emissions, and 
high resolution satellite imagery to show that significant amounts of ransom 
monies are spent within Somalia.126 Nightlight emissions, which are an 
excellent proxy for local and regional production and income in statistically 
challenged countries, shows that ‘pirates appear to invest their money 
principally in the [Somali] cities of Garowe and Bosasso rather than in the 
backward coastal communities.”127 Garowe and Bosasso are also known for 
providing “the material inputs and the ‘fire power’ of [many] pirate 
operations.”128 The change of light emissions is one method of detecting the 
distribution of piracy income because, in impoverished regions, these 
  
of pirates in the classical period was in many respects dependent on their organizational 
achievements and mutual fairness. Being organized and mutually fair was less problematic 
due to the fact that many of the pirates in the classical period were legitimate crewmen that 
walked away because of ill-treatment by their former officers. Today, piracy is not only 
growing but is becoming more organized than ever before. Trust, honor, organization, and 
fairness is also the backbone of the piratical financial system, Hawala. Just as many pirates 
in the classical period were legitimate crewmen, pirates today began as legitimate fisherman 
whose waters were dumped in and over-fished by different organizations. Somalia is 
stateless and unable to protect its territorial sea; therefore, it is rather easy for organizations 
to exploit and pollute the Somali coast. This exploitation has led fishermen to lose their 
livelihood and turn to piracy. As an aside, this trust and fairness among pirates is also the 
reason why Pirates, like other colorful outlaws, have fascinated many readers throughout the 
ages. See Pirates Had Democratic Ways, WORLD SCIENCE (Feb. 22, 2008), 
http://www.world-science.net/othernews/080222_pirates.htm. See also Analysis: Somalia 
Piracy Began in Response to Illegal Fishing and Toxic Dumping by Western Ships off Somali 
Coast, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www.democracynow.org/ 
2009/4/14/analysis_somalia_piracy_began_in_response. 
 123. Harper, supra note 119.  
 124. Id. 
 125. Note that Geopolicity proposed in its independent economic research program 
that strengthening and overcoming data paucity constraints will strengthen understanding of 
the entire piracy value chain. See GEOPOLICITY, supra note 62, at iv. 
 126. Anja Shortland, “Robin Hook”: The Developmental Effects of Somali Piracy 2 
(German Inst. for Econ. Research, DIW Berlin, Discussion Paper No. 1155, 2011), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1940271. 
 127. Id. at 1. 
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emissions indicate a clear sign of the movement in disposable income.129 
The report also used high resolution satellite images to corroborate the 
nightlight emission results; in Garowe, the satellite images showed 
“massive investment in housing and hotels, infrastructure, and religious and 
educational facilities between 2002 and 2009, with much of the 
development taking place in the latter part of the period.”130  
Anja Shorthand’s study also shows that finding pirates is extremely 
challenging because of the deep-rooted “culture of sharing” in Somalia.131 
Those who are more in Somalia raise their social status by sharing resources 
within social, clan-based networks, where individuals have an obligation to 
assist other members.132 “A Somali proverb says: ‘The man who owns 100 
goats, but his relatives have nothing, he is poor.’”133 When “Pirate Chief 
Abshir Boyah [was] questioned on how he spent his considerable profits 
from piracy, [he stated,] ‘it’s not like three people split a million bucks. It’s 
more like three hundred.’”134  
Investors, on the other hand, who take the lion’s share, do not operate 
within a “culture of sharing,” and therefore are less likely to spend ransom 
money on items that create local economic development.135 Rather, 
investors tend to spend ransom money on imported status goods such as 
sport utility vehicles (SUVs) and divert their proceeds through intricate 
money-laundering schemes.136 For analysts, tracing piracy ransom money 
though an intricate money-laundering scheme is extremely difficult. 
Appendix B shows how an intricate money-laundering scheme works when 
illegal proceeds are mixed with legitimate used car sale profits in Africa, 
and are sent to banks through exchange houses.137 The data in Appendix B 
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 130. Id. at 3. The province-level market data, nightlight emissions and high-resolution 
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 132. Shortland, supra note 126, at 7. 
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 137. Jo Becker, Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 13, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/14/world/middleeast/beirut-bank-seen-as-a-
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was gathered from a drug money laundering operation, which had ties to 
organizations in Africa, Europe, China, South America and the United 
States.138 Maritime security expert Christopher Ledger has expressed that 
the drug trade and piracy are similar in many respects; drug trade, “which 
started off as a relatively small-time operation” has grown into a “huge 
global crime,” which is also the path maritime piracy seems to be taking.139 
Moreover, international piracy is starting to replicate the drug industry in 
the United States, where billions of dollars are spent each year in trying to 
attempt to keep the drug situation under control. 
CONCLUSION 
The prosecution of criminals and the economics of criminal activity are 
intimately related. In terms of piracy, the CGPCS established Working 
Group 5 to focus on and coordinate efforts to disrupt the pirate enterprise 
ashore, but so far, a report has not been issued. In order to improve the 
economic conditions ashore, CPGCS has advocated the “Kampala Process, 
a Somali counter-piracy dialogue forum which discusses, inter alia, how to 
best strengthen the capacity to prosecute suspected pirates.”140One of the top 
priorities listed by the CGPCS has been “to increase the number of 
prosecutions,” as more than 1,000 pirates have been detained and 
prosecuted in 20 jurisdictions across the world as of July 2011.141 The 
authors’ conclusion is that none of the prosecutions will hold water if there 
is so much money out that the judges and lawyers can be bought off. It is 
hard to believe with the millions of dollars being spent by the UNODC and 
other groups in Somalia, that something will not be done; however, the 
authors are very pessimistic about the way things are going regarding 
funding of the pirates given the amount of cash involved.  
It does not help to see headlines indicating that the pirates have their own 
stock exchange.142 Yes, that is sadly true. Apparently, “the world’s first 
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pira[cy] stock exchange was established in 2009 in Harardheere, [which is 
located about] 250 miles northeast of Mogadishu, Somalia.”143 It is open 24 
hours a day and it allows investors to profit from ransoms collected on the 
high seas which can approach $10 million for successful attacks against 
Western commercial vessels.144 There are over 70 entities listed on this 
exchange, which provide Somali pirates with access to capital and pay 
investors a share of the profits. 145 A former pirate stated to Reuters that 
“‘[t]he shares are open to all and everybody can take part, whether 
personally at sea or on land by providing cash, weapons or useful materials. 
. . . We’ve made piracy a community activity.’”146  
CGPCS has stressed the international community’s anger at the ongoing 
suffering of kidnapped innocent seafarers, and their Tenth Plenary Session 
noted the important deterrent role of military Vessel Protection 
Detachments (VPDs) in preventing vessels from being pirated.147 Though 
international navies have substantially increased the difficulty in hijacking 
ships, investors have been forced to place more resources into maximizing 
the return from each captured ship.148 The increasing amount of financial 
investments from both the piracy benefactor and international community 
has caused maritime piracy to evolve into an environment where both 
pirates and navies are more violent than ever before.149 Navies are 
struggling to cope with the increasing surge of pirate attacks; while piracy 
itself has become “an expanding phenomenon[,]” both in terms of the level 
of activity and range.”150 It is hoped that the international community will be 
able to get all of this under control at some point. At present, there needs to 
be coordination between the results shown regarding the economics and 
financing of sea piracy with 1) the prosecution of pirates and 2) the 
organizers and backers of the various financial institutions that are involved 
with this enterprise. U.N. has issued numerous reports, which emphasize 
that in order for any viable success to be shown piracy has to be solved 
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within the gates of Somalia.151 The economics of piracy, however, is 
beginning to show that if piracy is not solved within Somalia’s borders soon 
then piracy may replicate the South American drugs trade in the 1970s—a 
relatively small-time operation which turned into a huge global crisis.  
  
 151. See, e.g., U.N. S.C. Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2010/394 (July 
26, 2010).  
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APPENDIX A 
Andrew Mwangura’s E-mail Request: 
 
1.  ·A complete list of all ships and hostages currently being held. The 
number of ships and hostages (along with date and location taken) 
 ·Asking Price, Current location and whether the ships are being    
used as mother ships 
 
2.  ·A complete list of all successful ransoms. 
  ·Name, flag, country of ownership, number of crew 
  ·Initial asking price for each ship 
  ·Eventual ransom paid 
  ·Time held in captivity before release 
 
3. ·A complete list of all pirate groups and financiers, including the     
locations they work out of. 
·A list of all pirate groups and their names, and an estimate of the   
number of pirates. 
Comparison to the number of groups over the same period last 
year, and the number of pirates. 
 
4. ·A complete list of hostages who died in this period, and how they     
were killed. 
 
5. ·An accurate figure of the number of attacks over the period  
     mentioned above. 
Included in this should be a month-by-month breakdown of  
    Number of attacks vs. success rate. 
 
6. A detailed look at the following trends: 
 ·Increase in violence against hostages. 
 ·How much has this increased? 
 ·Why is this changing? 
 ·The use of VPDs 
·How many vessels have VPDs today compared to one year ago 
(estimate of actual number and percentage of merchant shipping in 
piracy danger zone)? 
·How does this correlate to the number of successful attacks? 
·What is the general feeling in the shipping industry? 
·Will VPDs help quell the problem or cause more violence? 
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·Are there still concerns over rogue companies setting themselves    
up and providing poor security? 
  ·Change in pirate tactics 
  ·How have pirate tactics changed? 
  ·Are they using more force? 
  ·Do they have better weapons? 
  ·Are they ranging even further out to sea? 
·Are they now targeting governments for ransoms more, and 
why? 
·Are they keeping more sailors on land, and why (numbers, 
please)? 
·Are they using the media more to push negotiations (examples 
and evidence, please)? 
 
7. Community opposition to piracy 
·How much has this grown? How has this force the pirates to 
move? 
 ·What were the old hotspots and what are the new hotspots? 
 ·Anti-piracy initiatives 
·What new initiatives are we seeing, for example land-based pro-
grams? 
 ·How has the focus changed, if at all? 
 
 Prosecutions and deaths 
·How many pirates have been captured over the last year? 
·How many have been prosecuted over how many had to be re-
leased? 
 ·How many pirates have been killed? 
 ·How does these figures compare to the previous year? 
 ·Have prosecutions had any effect? 
 
 Ransom payments 
·Was the seizure of the ransom in Mogadishu a one-off, or could 
ransom payments be targeted in the future? 
 
 Navies 
 ·How many attacks have the navies disrupted? 
 ·How does this compare to the previous year? 
 ·Has this had any effect on the number of successful attacks? 
·Have they changed their tactics (for example, when they formed a 
barrier close to the Somali coast and targeted pirate vessels)? 
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 Costs 
 ·How much has this cost the shipping industry over the last year? 
 ·How does this compare to the previous one-year period? 
 Pirates and al-Shabaab 
·Are there any links between the pirates and al-Shabaab? We need 
evidence (names,  dates and payments made, and where they were 
paid).
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